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The Content of
Olfactory Experience
Abstract: Clare Batty has recently argued that the content of human
olfactory experience is ‘a very weak kind of abstract, or existentially
quantified content’, and so that ‘there is no way things smell’. Her
arguments are based on two claims. Firstly, that there is no intuitive
distinction between olfactory hallucination and olfactory illusion.
Secondly, that olfaction ‘does not present smell at particular loca-
tions’, and ‘seems disengaged from any particular object’. The pres-
ent article shows both of these claims to be false. It shows that naïve
subjects find it quite natural to draw a distinction between olfactory
hallucination and olfactory illusion. And it argues that the phenomen-
ology of normal olfactory experience is of particular objects as hav-
ing smells. Two confusions are responsible for Batty thinking
otherwise: (1) Batty’s examples are cases of extreme pungency, and
she mistakes a peculiarity of intense perceptions for a property of
olfaction more generally; (2) Batty focuses on very short time slices
and so confuses limitations on the information carried by a single
sniff for a limitation on the logical form of all olfactory content.
In an important contribution to a recent issue of this journal Clare
Batty argues that the content of human olfactory experience is ‘a very
weak kind of abstract, or existentially quantified, content’ (Batty,
2010, p. 21), and that: ‘As a result, there is no way that things smell’
(p. 19). Batty presents these conclusions as capturing certain manifest
features of the phenomenology of olfaction. Her aim, she tell us, is to
‘argue for a view about the nature of olfactory content that honors its
phenomenology’ (p. 11). But her conclusions’ claim to phenomen-
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ological plausibility is surely quite dubious. Even after reflection on
the nature of olfactory experience it seems phenomenologically accu-
rate to say the sort of thing that Batty’s view forbids us from saying:
that there is such a thing as a way that things smell. It seems perfectly
natural, for example, to say that my roses smell a certain way, that my
compost heap smells a different way, and that my lawn clippings smell
a third way. These claims seem obvious. They do not seem to be figu-
rative. Nor do they seem to be exaggerations, or instances of loose
talk. We should not give them up unless an argument proceeding from
even more obvious premises forces us to do so.
The argument that leads Batty into a position that gives up such
claims is based on an inference to the best explanation of two alleged
facts. The first of these alleged facts is that, because ‘the notion of an
olfactory illusion is not something that resonates with us’ (p. 12), ‘the
traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not
apply to olfactory experience’ (p. 24). The second alleged fact is that
‘olfactory experience does not present smells in distinct locations’ (p.
15) and so ‘seems disengaged from any particular object’ (p. 16), with
the result that olfaction ‘cannot solve the Many Properties Problem’;
where this ‘Many Properties Problem’ is understood as being ‘the
problem of distinguishing between scenes in which the same proper-
ties are instantiated but in different arrangements’ (p. 14).
Given the first of these two alleged facts as an explanandum the
inference that leads to Batty’s picture, as giving us the best account of
olfactory content, is relatively straightforward.
The traditional difference between hallucination and illusion, as
Batty understands it, depends on it being the case that in illusion, but
not in hallucination, we are presented with a real object as having
properties that it does not have. If olfaction presents no objects then, a
fortiori, it does not present real objects as having properties, and so it
never presents them as having properties that they do not have. But,
equally, if it presents no objects then nor does it present us with
objects other than those before us, and so it lacks a feature displayed
by paradigmatic cases of hallucination. Batty’s claim that no objects
figure in the contents of olfactory experiences therefore explains why
it should be that ‘the notion of olfactory illusion is not something that
resonates with us’ (p. 12) and why ‘the traditional distinction between
illusion and hallucination does not apply to olfactory experience’ (p.
24).
Batty’s explanation for the second alleged fact — that olfactory
experience cannot ‘distinguish between scenes in which the same
properties are instantiated but in different arrangements’ — is
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somewhat less straightforward. It depends on more than just the idea
that the content of olfaction is existentially quantified. This is because
it is possible, while using only existentially quantified representa-
tions, to ‘distinguish between scenes in which the same properties are
instantiated but in different arrangements’. To represent such a dis-
tinction one needs to make use of more than one existential quantifier,
and one needs to make use of an expression for non-identity. But Batty
will not allow that the content of olfaction includes more than one
quantifier. She writes that: ‘while a characterization of the content of
olfactory experience may be rich in terms of predicates (as rich as the
situation we are in and our discriminatory abilities will allow), it will
only ever need one quantifier’ (p. 20). Batty’s view, then, is that the
content of an olfactory experience is an unstructured set of properties,
represented as being instantiated at approximately the location of the
subject. With that restriction on the contents of olfaction in place it
would indeed be true that olfaction could not distinguish between
scenes in which the same properties are instantiated, but in different
arrangements. And so it would be true that olfaction cannot solve the
Many-Properties Problem.
Batty’s picture of the content of olfactory experience therefore pro-
vides explanations for both of the features that she claims are attrib-
utes of olfaction. Neither of those features, however, turns out to be a
genuine one.
Consider first the claim that ‘the traditional distinction between
illusion and hallucination does not apply to olfactory experience’.
This is simply mistaken. There are cases of olfactory misperception
that it is natural to characterize as hallucination. There are cases of
olfactory misperception that it is natural to characterize as illusion.
And there is a clear, and perfectly traditional, difference between
them. Batty herself accepts that there are examples of the first sort.
‘We seem to have no problem’, she says, ‘with the idea of an olfactory
hallucination’ (p. 12). One such example is that of the phantosmia
exhibited as an early symptom by some patients with Parkinson’s dis-
ease. Basile Landis and Pierre Burkhard give the following account of
such a phantosmia, as experienced by a 57-year-old Parkinson’s
patient:
Since 2000, she has complained of abnormal olfactory symptoms char-
acterized by the occurrence of brief, repeated, and stereotyped episodes
of strong smell sensations without substrate. Odorant perceptions were
difficult to describe precisely and did not correspond to known odors.
When prompted, she compared them to perfumes, to a ‘rainy day’, or
even to a ‘wet dog’, ascribing them a pleasant aspect. Episodes usually
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lasted a few seconds, up to minutes, and could occur many times per day
in an unpredictable fashion. Conversely, known odors were perfectly
identified, and she denied any subjective smell loss. (Landis and
Burkhard, 2008, p. 1237f)
It is surely quite natural to describe this patient as suffering from
olfactory hallucinations. That is exactly how Landis and Burkhard do
describe her. That is what sixteen of the students in my sample of
twenty-two said was the natural description of the case.
It is much less natural to describe these unpredictable episodes of
smells, experienced independently of whatever aroma substrates are
present in the environment, as olfactory illusions. Only five of the stu-
dents in my twenty-two student sample claimed to find ‘illusion’a nat-
ural description of the case. Two students weren’t sure how the case
should be described.1
For an example of the second sort — an olfactory distortion that it is
natural to describe as an illusion, but not as an hallucination — con-
sider the following, from the notes accompanying the recipe for ‘Cin-
namon and/or Vanilla Ice Cream’ in Heston Blumenthal’s The Fat
Duck Cookbook:
If you smell cinnamon followed by vanilla-and-cinnamon, what you get
is vanilla. And vice versa… Cinnamon and vanilla are particularly good
at this…
[A]n ice cream in a glass flanked by two plastic squeezy bottles with
conical tops narrow enough to nudge into a nostril… worked really
well, and the effect seemed both stranger and even more in need of an
explanation when the mouth was involved as well as the nose. I tried it
out on some of the regulars at the Fat Duck and it invariably provoked a
powerful mixture of amazement that it happened, and curiosity as to
why. (Blumenthal, 2008, p. 234)
It seems quite natural to describe the olfactory effect that this dish
depends on as an illusion. Seventeen of the students in my sample said
that they found that to be the natural description. It seems relatively
unnatural to describe the dish as inducing olfactory hallucinations.
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[1] Twenty-two undergraduates at the end of an ‘Introduction to Cognitive Systems’ course
were asked to fill in a questionnaire. The course from which the students were recruited
did not cover material related to olfaction, hallucination, or illusion. The questionnaire
presented the two examples discussed here, lightly edited for readability (e.g. in the Par-
kinson’s case, ‘Odorant perceptions’ became ‘These smell perceptions’, and in the cook-
book case ‘what you get is’ was replaced by ‘all you can smell is’). The two examples were
each followed by the question: ‘Do you find it more natural to describe this as a case of hal-
lucination, or as a case of illusion?’ Three answers were available to tick: ‘Hallucination’,
‘Illusion’, and ‘Not sure’. Half the students were given the cookbook case first. Half were
given the Parkinson’s case first. In both cases the three possible answers were presented in
the same order.
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Only four students regarded that description as natural. One student
was unsure. If we discard data from the three students who were
unsure about how to categorize one or other of the cases then a
chi-squared test reveals the trend in this data to be a statistically sig-
nificant one (2 =11.359, d.f.=3, P=0.0099).
The difference between the Parkinson’s symptoms and the gastro-
nomic trickery corresponds to, and is plausibly explained by, what
Batty identifies as the traditional distinction between illusion and hal-
lucination: in the illusory case we perceive a real object — the ice
cream — as having properties that differ from those it really has. In the
hallucinatory case no real object is being misperceived.
This is bad news for Batty’s claim that the content of human olfac-
tory experience is never a singular proposition, but only ever ‘a very
weak kind of abstract or existentially quantified content’. Batty would
have us believe that that claim has the virtue of collapsing a distinction
that, having no intuitive force, we ought to collapse. Instead her pic-
ture robs us of the resources that we need for the drawing of a distinc-
tion that is intuitively marked.
What, then, of Batty’s second alleged explanandum — her claim
that ‘olfactory experience does not present smells in distinct loca-
tions’, that smell ‘seems disengaged from any particular object’, and
so that olfaction cannot solve ‘the problem of distinguishing between
scenes in which the same properties are instantiated but in different
arrangements’? Again the consideration of examples calls this alleged
explanandum into question.
It may be by smell that I identify that there are traces of garlic on my
left hand and traces of ginger on my right. The experience by which I
discern that this is so is not one in which I find an object-independent
disengaged garlic smell to be around when raising my left hand to my
nose, and an object-independent disengaged ginger smell to be around
when raising my right. Such an experience would be possible, but it
would also be peculiar. It is not what we experience in the usual case.
In the usual case olfaction presents our two hands as, respectively, the
bearers of the two smells.
Batty is led to the mistaken view that object-independent, non-
localized content is what we always experience in olfaction because
her preferred examples of olfactory experiences are cases in which the
thing experienced is extremely pungent: they are cases where a whole
room is filled with lemon air freshener and with the smell of fish, or
where the smell of coffee pervades an entire space. In these extreme
cases it may be that the content of our experience omits information
about determinate location. But this is not a general feature of
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olfactory experience. Nor is the non-localization of extreme percepts
peculiar to the sense of smell. The auditory experience of a fire alarm
ringing somewhere in the street may present the sound as coming from
one house in particular, but when we are in the corridor where the
alarm is loudly ringing the experience is not of the sound as located in
any particular location, but of the sound as filling the entire space.
Even in the visual domain it may be that a bright strobe light some-
where in the visual field adds a general strobing content to the experi-
ence that is not exhausted by the experience of strobing that is tied to a
determinate location. It seems, then, to be typical of intense percepts
that they are experienced without determinate locations. In an impre-
cise modality, such as olfaction, the threshold at which localization
gives out may be relatively low. Batty’s choice of extremely pungent
examples therefore leads her to mistake the non-localization of
extreme perceptions for a general and peculiar feature of olfaction.
Despite the complication resulting from her focus on cases of
extreme pungency, Batty is not wholly mistaken here. She is right to
identify ‘Many Properties Problems’as marking a point at which there
seem to be constraints on the possible contents of olfactory experi-
ence. It does seem possible, pace Batty, to smell that a particular
object has an olfactory property. But what does not seem possible is to
have a purely olfactory experience that tells one how many objects
have that property. One may see that two of one’s fingers have been
painted red, rather than one, or feel that two of one’s fingers are being
stroked, rather than one, or hear that two of one’s fingers are tapping
on a resonant surface, rather than one. What one cannot do is to smell,
with a single sniff, that two of one’s fingers are garlicky, rather than
just one finger having received a double dose. If one wants to extract
quantitative information from olfaction then multiple sniffs will be
required.
To say this, however, is not to find an alternative way of getting to
the conclusion that Batty wants. Batty’s aim is to show that ‘accounts
of representational content cannot always be based on the visual
model’ (p. 11). But to say that olfaction does not give us quantitative
information in a single sniff is not to identify a respect in which the
content of olfactory experience is unlike the content of vision. In both
cases we must accept that the information carried by a single sensory
sampling is impoverished relative to the content presented in normal
experience. That this is so even in the visual case is one of the less con-
troversial lessons that has been taught to us by the very extensive liter-
ature on our inability to recognize changes that occur when we are
attending to the wrong thing, or that occur between saccades, or under
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the cover of an appropriate mask (Grimes, 1996; Mack and Rock,
1998; Noë, 2002; O’Regan et al., 1999). What is peculiar to the olfac-
tory case is just that in the olfactory case the distinct sensory
samplings occur at greater temporal intervals. Batty is therefore right
to identify something unusual in the way in which olfaction puts one
into sensory contact with the objects around one, but wrong in attrib-
uting this peculiarity to a restriction on the logical form of olfaction’s
content.
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